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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JOANN TSAKOLAS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
OGDEN CITY,.a body politic,
COWLES MALLORY, Ogden City
Manager; JOHN SAMPSON,.STEPHEN
DENKERS, and LYNN COTTRALL,.
Ogden City Civil Service
Commissioners;

Case No. 19656

Defendant and Respondents
and
OGDEN CITY,.a Municipal
Corporation,
Third Party Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,.
Third-Party Defendant
BRIEF Or RESPONDENTS JOHN SAMPSON,.STEPHEN DENKERS,.AND
LYNN COTTRELL, OGDEN CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONERS
AND THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of Judge Omer J.
Call allowing the Judges of the Third Circuit Court to direct
that an employee not be allowed to return to the Court Clerk's
Office to perform work there.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court ruled that the ex parte order of the Judges
of the Third Circuit Court directing Appellant to the personnel
office and not allowing her to continue in her position where
she had access to court records was proper and that the order
of Cowles Mallory, the City Managerf as modified by the Ogden
City Civil Service Commission, was proper.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents,.Ogden City Civil Service Commissionersf
and the State of Utah seek this court to sustain the decision
of the lower court as well as ruling that Appellant did not
become an employee of the State of Utah on July lf 1983.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to March 21, 1983f the Appellantf JoAnn
Tsakolas, served as lead clerk in the Third Circuit Court
Clerk's Office in Ogden City (T. 19). The Appellant was a
Range 15, Step 5 civil service employee (T. 148).
On Feoiuary 28, 1983, the Appellant attended a
meeting in the office of the Trial Court Executive, Margaret
Satterthwaite (T. 22). While there, the Appellant received a
letter containing several allegations of missing court records,
which was signed by both Mrs. Satterthwaite and Mr. K. D.
Miller, Director of Community Services (T. 22).
When questioned aoout the allegations, the Appellant
stated that she was aware that "points" or tickets were
withheld from the Driver's License Division (T. 23t 63).

-2-
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Thereafterf however, the Appellant refused to cooperate any
further either by telling what she knewf or by giving the names
of others involved (T. 23^ 24). This was the situation
irrespective or the fact that the Appellant held a supervisory
position (T. 20, Exhibit 3-P).
On March 4V 1983f the Acting City Manager, Jack
Ricnaras, suspended the Appellant pending an investigation and
hearing before the City Manager (T. 25f Exhibit 2-P). The
Appellant was again made aware of the allegations against herf
including the fact that in Utah, destroying public records is a
third degree felony (T. 39, Exhibit 2-P). A hearing was held
before the Ogden City Manager, Cowles Mallory, on March 18f
1983i(T. 26). Evidence brought to light at the hearing was
made known in Mr. Mallory's decision letter of March 21, 1983
(T. 27, Exhibit 3-P).
Included were the following:
1.

A traffic citation received by Appellant in the

fall of 1980 and indexed by the Court noted "bail forfeited",
however, the Driver's License Division showed no report of
conviction and the case is now missing from the court files.
2.
citation.

In 1979, Appellant's sister received a traffic

The case was not reported to the Drivers License

Division and is now missing from court files.

-3-
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3.

In 1980, Appellant's sister again received a

traffic citation and bail was posted.

Howeverf the Driver's

License Division has no record of conviction.
4.

In 1981, Appellant's brother received a citation

which was indexed and filed by the court.

Now both the case

and index card are missing from court files, and the Driver's
License Division shows no record of conviction.
5.

The appellant had received a citation and had

asked the Disposition Clerk in the Circuit Court not to send
the citation to the Statef thereby keeping the citation off
Appellant's record.

The disposition Clerk did send in the

citation, and the Appellant admits to having reprimanded the
clerk for sending the ticket in.

(Exhibit 3-P).

The City Manager determined that the Appellant had
"been involved in failing to notify the Driver's License
Division or traffic otfenses thereby keeping "points" from
being assessed against the violators as required by law."
(Exhibit 3-P). These findings resulted in the Appellant
receiving a fifteen day suspension without pay and a demotion
which would be etfective upon her return to work (Exhibit 3-P).
Upon receiving a copy of Mr. Mallory's decision, the
Board or Judges of the Tnird Circuit met and reviewed the
findings and its concerns relative to Appellant's returning to
the Clerks orfice (T. 140rl43).

-4-
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unanimously issued an Ex Parte Order "In the Interest of:
SECURITY OF COURT RECORDS" (T. 142v Exhibit 4-P).
The order was based on the Judges1 belief that the
"integrity of the (court) records had been . . • compromised",
because ot the Appellant's actions (T. 142^ Exhibit 4-P).
The Judges based their authority for such an action
on the statutory and implied powers of the court (T. 129) to
oversee court personnel and records (T. 130). The Judges'actions were not intended to terminate the Appellant's
employment (T. 131); they were meant only to safeguard court
records.
The Order stated:

" . . . upon her return to city

employment . . . report to the personnel department of the
City.

Under no circumstances is she to be allowed to perform

any function in the Circuit Clerk's Office."

(Exhibit 4-P).

Mr. Mallory issued an amended order on April 7> 1983,
reaffirming his decision of demotion and suspension but telling
Appellant that she could not return to the Clerk's Office.

Mr.

Mallory, not the Judges, placed Appellant on unpaid,.inactive
status stating that she would remain in that status until she
obtained other city employment, the Judges lifted their order
or July 1, 1983 arrived (T. 42^ Exhibit 5-P).
On April 7v 1983, the Appellant received a letter
from the City Manager which effectuated the Judges' ex parte
order.

The letter stated that following the expiration of her

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sick leave, compensatory and vacation timef the Appellant would
be placed on unpaid inactive status; and such status would
remain until other city employment was secured, or the Judges
order was lifted (T. 42, Exhibit 5-P).
The Appellant appealed to the Ogden City Civil
Service Commission.

In an order dated May 25f 1983, the Ogden

Civil Service Commission, sustain two separate actions:

(1)

The Judges Order which directed that Appellant could not
return to work in the Clerk's Office, and (2) the decision of
the city manager except that part of the decision which
appeared to transfer Appellant to the State of Utah come July
1, 1983, which was overturned with Appellant retaining City
employee status (T-45, Exhibit 6-P).
Appellant appealed to the Second District Court for
the State of Utah, and after trial, the Court ruled against
Appellant's position.
ARGPWEMI
POINT ONE
THE ACTION. OF THE JUDGES OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
WAS APPROPRIATE IN LAW AND WAS NOT THE CAUSE OF
APPELLANT'S CURRENT CONDITION
Appellant desires this Court to believe that somehow
the action of the Tnird Circuit Judges caused the current
condition of her with Ogden City.

In fact, Appellant admits

that the relationship is at most tenuous and attempts in a
feeble way to put the blame on the Judges.

-6-
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page nine, she states:

"Despite several attempts by Appellant

for other city employment,.she had been effectively fired."
(Emphasis aaded).
There is no question that the action taken by the
Judges set in motion a series of events that places Appellant
where she is now, but the record is devoid of any evidence that
the Judges either intended, attempted or succeeded in
terminating her from city employment.
On the contrary, the record speaks clearly to the
fact that no attempt was made to do what Appellant claims was a
result or the Judges' Order.

Judge Stanton M. Taylor, in

testimony, acknowledged that the Judges had no such authority.
He said:
JoAnn was a City employee and we are
not saying, hey, you have got to fire her.
That's obviously not within our perogative.
What we were saying is we don't want her back
in our Clerk's Office.
The Ex Parte Order (Exhibit 4-P) also sets forth
clearly that the Judges were directing the City to place her
in a position outside ot the clerk's office.

The Order reads:

YOU ARE HEREBY SPECIFICALLY ORDERED AND
DIRECTED by the Court to inform Ms. JoAnn
Tsakolas, upon her return to city employment
as she was instructed to do by the city
manager in his missive dated March 21, 1983,
to report to the personnel department of the
City.
(Emphasis added)
The order points out a couple of major items: First,
the Judges acknowledged that she was returning to "city

-7^
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employment"; secondf the personnel department was to work out
the details ot placing her in a different position from the
clerks orfice; thirdf she should in essence be assigned away
from the clerks orfice.
In viewing each of these areas, it is clear that the
Judges were acting appropriately under authority given to them
by both statutory and inherent power.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-/-5 describes the powers of
every court established in the State of Utah.

This statute

empowers the courts to control the conduct of their ministerial
officers and all persons connected with any judicial
proceeding.

In part,.it reads:

Every court has power . . . (5) to control in
furtherance of justice the conduct of its
ministerial otficers,.and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a
judicial proceeding before it in every matter
pertaining thereto. UCA § 78-7^5.
As an employee in the Third Circuit Court Clerk's
Otfice, the Appellant qualified under this statute as a person
in any matter connected with a judicial proceeding.

Hence,

this statute applied directly to the ability of the Judiciary
to control the presence or involvement of plaintiff in matters
pertaining to any judicial proceeding.
Appellant's access to Court records which directly
led to the circumstances here presented is clearly under the
jurisdiction of the Court.

-8-
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Additionallyf Utah Code Annotated § 78-7-6.allows
"[elvery court of record may make rulesf not inconsistent with
law, for its own government and the government of its officers
. • . ."

Respondent Commissioners and the State of Utah would

respectfully submit that the protection of court records by the
court itself is or sucn fundamental importance that to not take
action as done in this case would be violative of the most
basic trust and ethics of the Judiciary.
The Order as referred to previously is not a
termination orderf but an order "In the Interest of:
OF COURT RECORDS."

SECURITY

The protection of records was paramount,

fundamental and the sole basis of the Order (T-131).

The

court may issue orders encompassing who, when,.and where, etc.,
records may be accessed.

To not have such authority would

play havoc with the ability of the courts to control and
protect records and judicially sensitive areas.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is
"fundmental that the court may;supervise its officers."
Callister v. Callister, 393 P.2d 477 (Utah 1964).

In this

case, the Supreme Court determined that a probate judge must be
allowed the discretion of supervising his officers in order
that the court be aole to enjoy the public confidence.

The

court further determined that the executrix of an estate is an
officer of the court.

-9-
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This case illustrates two important points.

First,

where the public confidence in a court is threatened by the
actions of any officer of the court,.the court can and must
supervise the conduct of that officer.

Second, if the

executrix ot an estate is considered an officer of the courtf.
then surely someone employed in the Court Clerk's Office is
considered an officer of the court.
Under this Utah Supreme Court standard,.then, Judge
Taylor was acting within his authority in prohibiting the
plaintiff's working in the Clerk's Office because of the
greater interest of preserving the public confidence in the
court.
The City Manager's initial decision maintained intact
"city employment11.

The Judges' Order recognized that position

and acknowledged "city employment", just not to be in the
Clerk's Office.

As Judge Taylor testified:

Q. [Mr. Schwendiman] Were you attempting to
terminate her from employment?
A. No. I don't think we had the power to
terminate her from her employment. I think
the only thing we had power to say wasf you
can't come into our office" (T-131).
That was totally appropriate as the Judges acted in
issuing their order from the Findings of Cowles Mallory.

How

the Judges desired their decision to affect the court records
was discretionary with the Judges, not Mr. Mallory.

-10-
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The Indiana Supreme Court also held in Knox County
Council v. State ex. rel McCormick. 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d
405 (1940) that:
The Constitution of this state vests the
judicial power in the courts. The judicial
is an independent and equal coordinate branch
of the government. Courts were established
for the purpose of administering justice
judiciallyf and it has been said that their
powers are coequal with their duties. In
other words,<they have inherent power to do
everything that jt? peqgggayy to carry put the
purpose of their creation. . . .
A court of
general jurisdiction,.whether named in the
Constitution or established in pursuance of
the provisions of the Constitution, cannot be
directed, controlled, or impeded in its
functions by any of the other departments of
the government. (Emphasis added)
£ge 3lgo pyew V» County Attorney, Tulga CQVinty,
394 P.2d 246, (Okla. 1964) (quoting Inverarity v. Zumwalt, 97s.
Okla. Cir. 294, 262 P.2d 725 (1953)).
The existence of a City Civil Service System
"cannot interfere with the ultimate power of the judiciary to
administer its own affairs." Zylstra v. Pia, 85 Wash. 2d 743,
539 P.2d 823^ 827 (1975).
The appellant had duties which were an integral part
of the judicial\function.

A clerk's duties involve the

performance or a "public trust" which in the present case the
Appellant has violated.

The court, therefore, cannot

"relinquish either its power or its obligation to keep its own
house in order." Id., at 826.

-11-
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The court in In re Opinion of the Jugtiges, 14 N.E.
2d 465 (Mass. 1938), discussed the nature of the relationship
between the court and the clerk.
This power of removal is judicial in the
sense that it is incidental to the performance or the judicial functions of the court
. . . . As to these officers, [court clerks]
removal may be made as an administrative act
without judicial process or without explicit
requirement for hearing. The validity of
such removal rests upon the intimate
relationship between the duties of these
officers and the performance of service
essential to the courts . . . .
Officers who
perform work in connection with the courts
may be removed as an incident of the judicial
function.
Finally, the Nevada Supreme Court held the same way
in a fact setting somewhat similar to the case at bar.

In

City o$ North Lag Vegas yy pajneSr 550 P.2d 399, a municipal
court relieved the plaintiff of her duties as municipal court
administrator.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the

municipal judge acted within his inherent authority in
relieving the municipal court administrator of her duties in
the absence or evidence establishing an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of that power.

Id., at 401.

The rationale of the

court was that "the judiciary, as a co-equal branch of
government,.has the inherent power to protect itself and to
administer its affairs."

Id.. at 400.

Though several ot the above cited cases involve
individuals without any "civil service" protections, it should
be pointed out that in the present situation, the judges only

-12-
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restricted appellants access to one segment of city employment.
The Court's Order did not in any way terminate Appellant's
employment rights with the city - only that she was not to go
back to the clerks otfice.

This decision was based on findings

already entered by the City Manager.

The court had authority

both statutorily and inherently to act as it did.
If Appellant has any claim in this matter at all, it
is in relation to the decision of Mr. Cowles Mallory in placing
her on inactive status instead of placing her in another
position.

Appellant has not appealed the decision of Mr.

Mallory whicn is what placed her in her present condition.
Mr. Mallory himself admits that he had authority to
place her in another area of city government and comply both
with the intent of the original order of retaining her city
employment and the Judges order saying she should not work in
the clerk's otfice.

On cross examination by Mr. Schwendimanf.

the following dialogue took place:
Q. Weilf I mean prior to placing her on this
Civil Service list. As a City employee who
you put on inactive status, did you make any
attempt to say, all right, here is an opening
in this area. You are being placed in this
position?
A. Well, I don't run the City
administration that way in placing employees
(T. 96).
* * *

Q, (By Mr. Schwendiman) I believe the
last question was you did not make an attempt
to transter her after you learned that the

-13-
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Judges weren't going to issue some kind of
mass order; is that correct?
A.

Yesf sir.

Q. You did not remove her from inactive
status and place her in another position on
active; is that correct?
A. That's correct, but I just simply don't
run the Personnel system of the City to the
point where we place employees without the
consent of the department (T-97).
Mr. Mallory's admission confirms that it is not
against the Civil Service System to place her, he just chose
not to do so.

That is not the fault of the Judges or the order

issued by them.

This was purely a decision made by him without

the knowledge ot the Judges.

Judge Taylor testified that the

Judges were not involved in any of Mr. Mallory's decisions and
only after the fact did they receive a copy of a letter placing
her on inactive status (T-134).
The above certainly vindicates the Judges of any
improper action.
else.

Mr. Mallory chose not to place her somewhere

This decision is the sole basis of any claim to city

employment she might have.

This decision of Mr. Mallory has

not been appealed, and is not before the court.

However,

Appellant confused the actual bifurcation of the process and
cannot hold the Judges responsible for her present condition.
POINT TWO
THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE THIRD CIRCUIT JUDGES
DID NOT DENY DUE PROCESS TO APPELLANT AND DID
NOT VIOLATE HER CIVIL SERVICE RIGHTS

-14-
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Without undue repetition Mr. Mallory's action and
not the action of the Judges is the catalyst to the problems
presently before this Court.. The express intent of the Judges'
Order as verified by the evidence presented at trial was to
have Ms. Tsakalos transferred to a different Department of City
Government and diu not constitute termination.

Mr. Mallory's

own decision and not that of the Judges placed Appellant on
inactive status.
The District Court for the District of Columbia was
involved in an actual termination case wherein some of the
current issues were discussed.

In Hadigen v. Board of

Governors, Federal Reserve System, 463 F.Supp. 437-, (D.C.
1978), the Court said:
There is no requirement that an agency provide
an employee with the procedural rights triggered
by an adverse action merely because it changes
his work assignment or restricts his use of
equipment. Such a change or restriction is not
a removal . . . . w (Emphasis added.)

f

Appellant argues that the Judges' Order was a
removal.

Not so.

It was a directive for reassignment to a

different area of city government.

This is not a denial of due

process, for if an employee is transferred or changed between
joos at the same salary and benefits,.etc., that is totally
allowed by civil service rules as well as the right of
management.

Appellant has presented no evidence that such a

transfer is unconstitutional or that due process is denied
through transfer.

This is likewise sustained in Hadigen.

-15-
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The failure of Cowles Mallory to effectuate a
transfer as he admitted he did not attempt to do (T. 95-6) is
the only issue that can possibly be challenged and that issue
has not been appealed.
The demotion and suspension of the Appellant is a
separate issue, separate and apart from the present claims.
This also was not appealed.

Any claim for a denial of due

process has been directed to the wrong party.
The record is replete with substantiation that
Appellant received due process in her hearing before the Ogden
City Manager.

Appellant was notified of the charges,.was

granted a hearing where evidence was taken and where she was
represented by counsel, a decision rendered which listed
findings or fact and conclusions.

She appealed both to the

City Civil Service Commission and ultimately the District Court
all of whicn sustained the findings.
The Judges issued their order based on the findings
and conclusions of Mr. Mallory.

In fact, Appellant admitted to

many of the serious allegations, all of which happened when she
was a supervisor.

Her major contention before the Commission

and the District Court was not that she was innocent of serious
charges (for she freely admitted involvement) but was the
perceived disparity in treatment between herself and other
employees.

-16-
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Because of the unique nature of the court's authority
to protect its records as was discussed in Point If above, the
Court had every right to issue the order to protect its records
based on its interpretation of findings of Mr. Mallory.

The

Court was adding no further punishment and was not disciplining
Appellant.

It was solely ordering that the city transfer her

away from the Clerk's Office for the protection of the Court's
records.
Appellant has not established that the court could
not do what it did.

In factf that portion of the Civil Service

Rules and Regulations cited by Appellant help establish that
there was nothing out of the ordinary as to this directive by
the court except that Mr. Mallory chose not to transfer her.
The rule cited by Appellant does not prohibit
transfer or reassignment to other equivalent classes or levels.
There has been no showing or evidence presented either by the
Appellant or the city that this was an impossibility.

In fact,

Appellant testified that she had been interviewed several times
for openings (T. 44). Her not being placed in one of those
openings is a matter of contention between her and the city and
has no bearing on the order issued by the Judges.
The only authority Appellant cites this Court in
support ot its broad assertions is Gabe v. County of Clark.
701 F.2d 102 (9th Cir., 1983).

Gabe is not applicable in

this situation because it stands for that which has already
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been complied with —
the Judges.

at least as it relates to the Order of

Gabe stands for the proposition that the status

ot an employee's position cannot be changed without giving the
employee adequate notice of the change.
In the present case, the plaintiff received the
required noticef as well asr a hearing before the City Manager.
The Appellant was not denied due process to which she was
entitled.

See, e.g. Webb v. Dillon. 593 F.2d 656 (5th

Cir. 1979).

Tne Appellant, however, received more than minimum

protection.
The Order of the Judges did not change "status." The
demotion and suspension already were based on the due process
she had received.

That was the "status11 change.

The order

only mandated that reassignment consistent with the decision of
Mr. Mallory be effectuated.

Transferf as already discussed in

relation to Hadigen, supra. was totally appropriate.
In Gabe the plaintiff was an employee in the Clark
County Clerk's Otfice from June 1971 to September 1976. In
September ot 1976 Ms. Gaue was transferred to the Eighth
Judicial District as a legal secretary for Judge Keith Hayes.
New personnel rules were adopted in April 1978 stating that the
judges' secretary served at the pleasure of the judges and were
not entitled to "the normal termination procedures of notice
and hearing accorded regular County employees."
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no notice or the rule and upon her discharge was given neither
written notice nor a hearing.
The facts of Gabe are completely inappropriate to
the present case.

The Appellant was never treated as an "at

will" employee by the judges; their ex parte order restricted
Appellant's access to court records,.but did not terminate her.
In fact, the language of the order states "upon her return to
employment" she be reassigned.

Such is not the language one

uses to terminate someone as claimed by Appellant.
The results of the ex parte order are the doing of
Ogden City and not the Board of Judges.

If there was a denial

of due process or a violation of Civil Service Rules, it was
not through the actions of the Judgesf.but through the actions
of Mr. Mallory.

This has not been appealed.

In factf Exhibit

6-P, the Oruer of the Ogden City Civil Service Commission
expressly states that the Ogden City Manager's actions were in
compliance with its Rules wherein it says:

"IT IS ORDERED that

the Order of the Ogden City Manager dated April 7v 1983, is
sustained except . . . " The District Court also sustained that
Order of the Commission and Mr. Mallory.

This was handled as a

separate item by the Commission who separately sustained the
right of the Judges to not allow her to go back to the clerk's
otfice.
It appears that what Appellant is trying to do is
appeal the Decision of the City Manager dated April 7v 1983,
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under the guise of there being a violation by the Judges.
two are separate and distinct.

The

This attempt to "bandaid"

causes ot action to somehow "stick" them together is
inappropriate.

In light of such serious findings of fact by

the City Managerf a mere demotion would not protect the
records.

The Appellant would still have access to the records

and, therefore, a continuing opportunity to breach her
fiduciary duty.

The Judge's order was designed to deny such

access to the Appellant,.but not designed to terminate the
Appellant's job.

Therefore, Gabe as supporting authority,

misses the mark.
There was no denial of due process on the part of the
Judges in issuing their order and there was no denial of
Appellant's civil service rights by the Judges or their order.
POINT THREE
APPELLANT DID NOT BECOME A STATE EMPLOYEE AS OF
JULY 1, 1983w THE ORDER OF THE OGDEN CITY CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION TO THAT EFFECT WAS CORRECT.
Ogden City, as a third party plaintiff, alleges that
the Appellant should be considered a state employee as of July
1, 1983, because of Utah Code Ann. 78-4-21(2).

However, such a

result would be an injustice and would be inconsistent with the
true interpretation and meaning of 78-4-21(2).
Statute 78-4-21(2) reads in pertinent part as
follows:
As ot July 1, 1983, circuit court support staff
and clerical personnel in primary circuit court
locations as certified by the state court
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administrator shall be employees of the State of
Utah. Persons employed as circuit court support
staff and clerical personnel as of January 1,
1983, shall automatically be designated
employees of the State of Utah.
It has long been the policy of the courts to refrain
from the use of statutory construction when the language used
in a disputed statute is clear and unambiguous.

This principle

was empnasized in the case of State v. Archuletta, 526.P.2d
911.(Utah 1974) where the court stated:
The intention of the legislature is to be
collected from the words they employ. Where
there is no ambiguity in the words,,there is no
room for construction. [citing United States
v. Wiltberger, 5;Wheat. 76, 95* 5 L.Ed. 37(1920) (at 912)]
The wording ot Utah Code Annotated § 78-4-21(2)
appears clear and unambiguous at first glance.

Applying this

statute as it reads on its face (as urged by the City), the
Appellant should be deemed a state employee as of July lf 1983,
because she was employed among the clerical personnel in a
primary circuit court location as of January 1, 1983. Thus,.
the city contends she should automatically become a state
employee as of July 1, 1983.
However, applying this same reading of this
supposedly clear and unambiguous statute, any person who was
employed as clerical personnel as of January 1, 1983f who
subsequently retired in the interim between January 1, and July
1/ would also be deemed a state employee as of July 1, 1983.
The same situation would apply to anyone so employed who was
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subsequently terminated from his or her position or transferred
to a different agency in city government.

And if these

examples are not adequate illustration of the potential
absurdities resulting from application of the "clear11 meaning
of the statute, it is also truef according to the words of the
statute on its face, that any person so employed as of January
1, 1983r who subsequently died between January 1 and July 1,
would nevertheless be automatically deemed a state employee as
of July 1, 1983 even though that person may now be dead.
It is ridiculous to believe the legislature intended
that retired, transferredf fired or expired people
automatically become state employees.

A statute subject to

interpretation is presumed not to have been intended to produce
absurd consequences,.but to have the most reasonable operation
that its language permits.
111. 312f 111 N.E. 128.

Uphoff v. Industrial Board, 217

If possible, doubtful provisions

should be given a reasonable, rational, and sensible
construction.
484:

Alexander v. Cosden Pipe Line Co.. 290 U.S.

In the case ot Hernandez v. Frothmiller, 204 P.2d<854

68 Ariz. 242 (1949), the Arizona Supreme Court said:
We recognize the rule that, when giving the
literal meaning to language of a statute results
in an absurdity or impossibility, courts will
under some circumstances alter, modify, or
supply words in order to give effect to the
plain intention of the lawmaker.
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Since absurd results will occur through applications
ot the Utah statute as it reads on its facef it is appropriate
for the court in this case to search for the true intent of the
legislature.

In seeking the true meaning of the statutef one

must "assume that every statute contains a logical and complete
legislative scheme . . . It is this legislative scheme that
should be regarded as the purpose,.object, intentr spiritf of
the act."

4 Sutherland Statutory Construction 26.

The

logical meaning or the statute is that the legislature intended
that those who were employed as support staff or clerical
personnel in primary circuit locations as of January 1, 1983f
should automatically become state employees as of July lf 1983
—

provided howeverf.that they continued in their employment

through June 30f 1983w
This likely meaning is supported by language found
within the same statute.

U.C.A. 78-4-21(2) goes on to say that

"compensation for circuit court personnel employed as municipal
employees prior to July lf 1983f and who become state employees
after July 1# 1983, shall not be less than the compensation
received as municipal employees prior to January lf 1983.
Circuit court personnel employed as municipal employees prior
to July lf 1983f shall become state employees without loss of
tenure or other benefits ... . ." This passage evidences the
intent ot the legislature that the provisions of the statute
apply to those who are employed prior to July 1, or in other
words, up to and through June 30, 1983*
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As was argued before in this Brieff the status of
whether Mr. Mallory was correct in his decision to place
Appellant on inactive status has really not been appealed.

The

Ogden City Civil Service Commission in essence ruled that
Appellant maintain "city" employee status, but not "court
clerk" status.

There are many Ogden City employees who did not

become state employees on July 1, 1983. Appellant is no
different from these.

Though she was employed in the Clerks

office on January 1* 1983, she was not working there on June
30, 1983 and, and had not been working there since March, 1983.
The Civil Service Commission acknowledged in its
Order that she maintain city status.

This is wholly consistent

with the statutory language cited above, as well as the
actualities or what happened.
CONCLUSION
Appellant has appealed issues that have no ripeness
to be before this Court.

The action taken by the Judges did

not violate Appellant's rights but merely mandated a change in
assignment.

The proper party has not been named or "appealed"

for what Appellant seeks in relief.
Judges of the Third Circuit,.as do other judges,.have
not only the right, but the duty to oversee the court records.
The action of the Board ot Judges was pursuant to both that
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right and duty.
rights.

There was no violation of the Appellant's

The judges restricted the Appellant's access to court

records they did not terminate her.
All the process due the Appellant she received.

It

would be inequitable to allow the Appellant to rely on civil
service rules to retain a position of trust which she
blantantly and repeatedly violated.
The decision of the District Court as it relates to
the Order of the District Court should be affirmed in its
entirety.
Appellant did not become a state employee on July 1,
1983.

The City's limited argument is not convincing or

correct.
DATED this

&fcr

day.of Marchf 1984:
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

.'EPHEN GT SCHWENDIMAN
-Assistant Attorney General
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